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The Requirements for ABA Approval
of Law Schools: An Antitrust
Analysis of the Means of
Accreditation
I. Introduction
Many state courts have promulgated rules demanding that cer-
tain educational and personal criteria be met by applicants for their
respective bar examinations. One requirement, which has been
adopted by Pennsylvania,' many of the other forty-nine states, Pu-
erto Rico, and the District of Columbia, is that the applicant must
graduate from a law school accredited2 by the American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA). Individuals have challenged this demand, alleging vio-
lations of civil rights,3 due process,4 and equal protection.5 The cases
have led to judicial review of the states' application requirements,
and the courts have uniformly found the criteria reasonable, often on
the basis of language in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners:6
A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good
1. PA. BAR ADMISSION R. 203(2). The Rule is as follows:
The general requirements for admission to the bar of this Commonwealth are:
* 0 *
(2) Receipt of an earned Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor degree from an
accredited law school. ....
Id. The phrase "accredited law school" is defined as "[a] law school accredited by the Ameri-
can Bar Association." Id., Rule 102(a).
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Manderino dissented from the adoption of this re-
quirement, iter a/ia, as an unconstitutional "delegation to a private organization of a portion
of the Judicial Authority to regulate the admission to the practice of law in Pennsylvania
.... " PA. R. CT. at 102 (Desk Copy 1978).
2. In the context of this discussion the term "accreditation" shall denote acceptance of
an institution's qualification. The ABA, however, terms such accreditation "approval."
3. Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1966), cerz. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966).
4. Potter v. New Jersey Sup. Ct., 403 F. Supp. 1036 (D.NJ. 1975) (three-judge court)
aj'dmem., 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976).
5. Ostroff v. New Jersey Sup. Ct., 415 F. Supp. 326, 328 (D.NJ. 1976).
6. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an appli-
cant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connec-
tion with the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.7
A poignant example of the blind affirmation of a state's bar ex-
amination requirements is found in Lombardi v. Tauro.s Although
the First Circuit Court expressed regret that Lombardi encountered
difficulties in the interface of the Massachusetts requirements, the
court nevertheless denied his appeal because both the state's require-
ment of a degree from a qualified law school and the law school's
requirement of a degree from a four-year college were rationally re-
lated to their objective that only qualified persons be permitted to
practice law.
The adoption by many states of the requirement that bar exami-
nation applicants graduate from ABA-accredited law schools reflects
the ABA's successful implementation of an express policy: "The
American Bar Association believes that every candidate for admis-
sion to the bar should have graduated from a law school approved
by the American Bar Association. . . ."I This language evidences
the ABA's desire and intention to control a crucial aspect of every
potential applicant's entry into the legal profession. Thefact of con-
trol has been unanimously endorsed by the courts,'0 but the precise
methods and criteria manifested in the ultimate decree of a law
school's accreditation must be scrutinized within the context of the
antitrust laws to determine whether they impose unreasonable re-
straints on a potential law student's entry into the legal profession or
on the competitive position of the law school.
II. Antitrust Law and Accreditation
A. Accreditation and Evaluation Generally
"Accreditation is the process whereby an association or agency
recognizes an institution as having met certain predetermined stand-
ards. The process. . . involves establishment of standards of quality
7. Id at 239.
8. 470 F.2d 798 (lst Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973). Massachusetts re-
quired a bachelor's degree from an approved college, but invoked a grandfather clause that
exempted those law students who began law school before September 1966 and had completed
one-half of the work required for a bachelor's degree. Sup. JuD. CT. RuLEs MAss., rule
3-01(3)(1) (1972). Since Lombardi had completed two years of college and had begun law
school before the 1966 deadline, he fulfilled the state requirements. Because Lombardi lacked
a four-year bachelor's degree, however, he was denied official graduation by the law school
and, therefore, was refused the same opportunities to sit for the Massachusetts bar exam as his
classmates. 470 F.2d at 799-800 n.2.
9. Approval ofLaw Schools: ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure, § 102 (1977) (here-
inafter cited as ABA Standards.
10. Lombardi v. Tauro, 470 F.2d 798, 800-01 (Ist Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919
(1973); Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499, 502-03 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960 (1966);
Ostroff v. New Jersey Sup. Ct., 415 F. Supp. 326, 328-29 (D.NJ. 1976); Potter v. New Jersey
Sup. Ct., 403 F. Supp. 1036, 1037-40 (D.NJ. 1975), aI'dmem., 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976).
and identification of those institutions which have achieved them.""l
Accreditation by its very nature injures those unable to attain the
required standards. It is best accomplished by the peers of the insti-
tution under review and is generally not enhanced by judicial intru-
sion. '
2
The courts have reviewed accreditation standards in previous
antitrust actions, but they have proved reluctant to find that the
standards unreasonably restrain commerce or the opportunities of
those under their aegis. A leading case, Marjorie Webster Junior Col-
lege, Inc. v. Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary
Schools, Inc. ," which examines accreditation of an educational in-
stitution within an antitrust framework, appears on its face to re-
move accreditation methods and criteria from judicial review for
antitrust violations, yet it establishes the foundations for a successful
prosecution of unreasonable, anticompetitive, or unconstitutional ac-
creditation.
B. Marjorie Webster Junior College
Middle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools,
Inc. (Middle States) was a voluntary, nonprofit educational corpora-
tion whose primary activity was accrediting member institutions and
applicants for membership. Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc.
applied to Middle States for accreditation, but Middle States main-
tained a previous policy and refused to consider Marjorie Webster
for accreditation because the latter was not a nonprofit organization
with a governing board representing the public interest. Subsequent
to this refusal, Marjorie Webster sued to compel consideration of its
application for accreditation without regard to its proprietary
financial structure.
The district judge in Marjorie Webster ruled that he must focus
his attention not on whether the defendant association was engaged
in a trade, but whether plaintiff's trade had been restrained.'" The
court continued,
A combination which imposes unreasonable restraints on the
trade of others is actionable under the [Sherman] Act. An intent
11. Majorie Webster Jr. College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 459,461
(D.D.C. 1969), rev'don other grounds, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970). For an excellent analysis of accreditation and evaluation, see Oulahan, The Legal Im-
plications of Evaluation and Accreditation, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 193, 193-204 (1978).
12. Parsons College v. North Cent. Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, 271 F. Supp.
65, 74 (N.D. 11M. 1967) (Hoffman, J.).
13. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
14. 302 F. Supp. 459, 466 (D.D.C. 1969), citing American Med. Ass'n v. United States,
317 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1943).
to restrain trade is not an essential element of the proof. The bur-
den is met if it is shown that the consequences flowing from the
activity complained of amounted to a restraint of trade. ... A
violation of the antitrust laws exists if the combining results in a
special advantage to members of an association over non-mem-
bers or deprives the non-member of a significant business serv-
ice. 15
A key to the court's decision lies in its determination that opera-
tion of an educational institution is commerce and is protected by
the antitrust laws.' 6 Of further importance is the court's finding that
"[a]ccreditation is necessary to engage in effective competition in the
field of higher education today."' 7 The denial of accreditation is,
therefore, a restraint of trade or commerce, and the district court
found a violation of the Sherman Act in the unreasonable standards
used to deny Marjorie Webster its accreditation.'"
The circuit court reversed the lower court's holding that the an-
titrust laws had been violated. The Sherman Act is tailored for the
business world, the court reasoned, not for the noncommercial as-
pects of the liberal arts or the learned professions.' 9 The court con-
cluded that accreditation of an educational institution is "an activity
distinct from the sphere of commerce; it goes rather to the heart of
the concept of education itself.'2
Since the court believed that Marjorie Webster would be able to
operate successfully without accreditation, it accorded the accredit-
ing institution substantial deference in the promotion and applica-
tion of its standards.2' If the court had found that denial of
accreditation would prevent successful operation of the college, the
standards and their application would have been subjected to more
discriminating analysis.
15. Id. at 466-67 (citations omitted).
16. Id at 465-66. "Higher education in America today possesses many of the attributes
of business. To hold otherwise would ignore the obvious and challenge reality." Id at 466.
17. Id at 469.
18. Id at 471.
19. 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The court cited a footnote from Klor's, Inc. v.
Broadway Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959): "[T]he Act is aimed primarily at
combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to
organizations, like labor unions, which normally have other objectives."
20. 432 F.2d at 655.
21. We do not believe... that the record supports the conclusion that appellee will
be unable to operate successfully as ajunior college unless it is considered for accred-
itation by appellant.
Accordbily, we believe that judicial review of appellant's standards should ac-
cord substantial deference to appellant's judgment regarding the ends that it serves
and the means most appropriate to those ends.
Id at 657 (emphasis added).
C Applicability of Marjorie Webster to Accreditation of Law
Schools
The finding by the circuit court that the accreditation process
contained no "commercial objectives" was based at least in part on
the "learned profession" exclusion from the antitrust laws, which has
been severely restricted in the wake of recent United States Supreme
Court decisions and Federal Trade Commission Chairman Pert-
schuk's remarks drawing the legal profession into the meaning of
commerce for antitrust purposes.2 2 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar23 the Court ruled that the practice of law was within the realm
of commerce as used in the antitrust laws. The Court addressed two
facets of the commercial nature of the legal profession. First, the
Court recognized that the practice of law, although perhaps not com-
merce itself, could "affect commerce" by its irremedial necessity in
many business transactions.24 Second, the Supreme Court went be-
yond merely affecting commerce and found that certain aspects of
the practice of law are themselves commerce. 25 Later cases have set-
tled any concerns that the Goldfarb inclusion of lawyers within com-
merce was an aberration.
26
The circuit court, basing its decision on a finding that denial of
accreditation did not actually injure Marjorie Webster Junior Col-
lege, deferred to Middle States' accreditation requirements.27 But in
a state that requires graduation from an accredited law school for a
person to take the bar examination, it is folly to suggest that a law
school is not competitively injured by a denial of accreditation. De-
nial of accreditation would prove even more disastrous should the
ABA prove successful in its drive to require graduation from an ac-
credited law school for all applicants to bar examinations throughout
the nation.28
The latitude afforded Middle States' accrediting standards in
Marjorie Webster must be denied in the case of accreditation of edu-
cational institutions such as law schools.29 Although, as mentioned
22. 844 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at A-14 (12/22/77) (speech entitled
"New Directions for the FTC" delivered in November 1977 before the 1lth New England
Antitrust Conference).
23. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
24. Id at 788.
25. Id at 787-88. A footnote to this discussion warns that the court has decided to con-
sider the practice of law as commerce in Goldfarb, but the bar should not expect it to do so
again. Id at 788 n.17.
26. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), in which the Court
remarked, "[Tihe belief that lawyers are somehow 'above' trade has become an anachronism
. Id at 371-72.
27. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
28. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
29. The Marjorie Webster courts heard no arguments that the nonaccreditation of the
school injured the students' professional aspirations. They heard only that high school stu-
earlier, the fact of accreditation is beyond dispute, analysis of the
accreditation requirements imposed on law schools must be under-
taken in a traditional antitrust investigation. The ensuing examina-
tion assumes that accrediting institutions and their procedures are
judicially reviewable as imposing potentially unreasonable restraints
on competition, with effects on both the law schools and their stu-
dents.3°
III. Rule of Reason Analysis of the ABA/AALS Standards for
Accreditation
Because the Interpretations of the ABA Standards and the Ap-
proved Association Policy statements explaining the American Asso-
ciation of Law Schools (AALS) By-Laws are accorded great weight
in decisions on approval and accreditation, these published state-
ments must be considered in conjunction with the actual require-
ments in any judicial review.
A. The Rule of Reason
Accreditation of law schools is not, in and of itself, a per se vio-
lation of the antitrust laws. Absent a finding of a per se violation,
any alleged restraints of trade must be subjected to a determination
of their reasonableness. The checklist of reasonableness to which
myriad courts have referred, including the courts in Marjorie
Webster,3' is found in Justice Brandeis' opinion in Chicago Board of
Trade.
32
[Tihe legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined
by so simple a test, as whether it restrains competition. Every
agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains.
To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of legal-
ity is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it s such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question
the courts must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the busi-
ness to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of restraint, the evil believed to
exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose
or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts."
dents who realize that they may not transfer their credits to a four-year college would not
attend Marjorie Webster. The growing number of accredited junior colleges and four-year
colleges, however, provides those students with alternative avenues to higher education. No
such alternatives have arisen for college graduates who wish to pursue a career in the legal
profession. They may be denied that opportunity because new law schools cannot develop in
the face of possibly over restrictive accreditation requirements.
30. A full development of the elements of an antitrust action against accrediting institu-
tions is presented in Oulahan, supra note 11, at 211-22.
31. 302 F. Supp. at 467; 432 F.2d at 653 n.8.
32. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
33. Id at 238.
B. Sec'c Requirements for Accreditation
L Number of Full-time Faculty.-One objection raised about
accreditation might be the requirements of a minimum number of
full-time faculty-six by the ABA34 and four by the AALS.
35
Neither the ABA nor the AALS offer any rationale for the selection
of these magic numbers, nor do they really need to do so. A federal
court reviewed the Arizona requirement that applicants for entrance
to its bar must have graduated from an ABA-accredited law school.
In upholding the requirement, the court remarked, "Once we con-
clude that some restriction is proper, then it becomes a matter of
degree-the problem of drawing the line. ''36 The court will not de-
clare the line drawn unreasonable without strong proof thereof of-
fered by the complainant. The fact that the ABA and AALS differ in
the minimum number required is helpful to plaintiff, but is certainly
not enough in itself to satisfy the burden of proof. This is particu-
34. (a) The law school shall have not fewer than six full-time faculty members, in
addition to a full-time dean and a law librarian. It shall have such additional mem-
bers as are necessary to fulfill the requirements of this Chapter and the needs for its
educational program, with due consideration for
(i) the size of the student body and the opportunity for students to meet with
and consult faculty members on an individual basis,
(ii) the nature and scope of the educational program, and
(iii) adequate opportunity for effective participation by the faculty in the
governance of the law school.
ABA Standards, supra note 9, § 402(a).
Interpretation 1 of 402(a): The intent of Standard 402(a) is that a single division
law school in its first year of operation should have a minimum of six full-time
faculty, in addition to a full-time dean and law librarian. A dual division law school
or a law school offering instruction in more than one year must have additional full-
time faculty in a satisfactory proportional ratio.
Memorandum 7778-27, Interpretations of the American Bar Association Standards and Rules of
Procedurefor Approval of Law Schools 18 (ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar 1978) (hereinafter cited as ABA Interpretations).
35. Section 6-1. To the end that high standards of legal education be fostered, each
member school shall maintain:
4. A faculty of high competence and suitable size, vested with primary respon-
sibility for determining institutional policies.
Association of American Law Schools, Association Information § 6-1(4) (1978) (hereinafter
cited as Association Information).
Upon the full-time faculty members rest the major burdens of planning and exe-
cuting the institution's instructional work. Not even a school with the narrowest pos-
sible program and with only a few students could meet its obligations with fewer than
four full-time faculty members and a law librarian in addition to the dean (who ex-
cept in case of emergency should devote full time to the school's administration and
instruction). An effective program cannot be maintained in all its ramifications when
the student-teacher ratio becomes too large for ready professional relationships. In
1956-1957, the average number of students per full-time professor in member school
was 16.5; the median was 22. Only eight schools had as many as 50 students for every
full-time faculty members. (Anatomy of Modern Legal Education, 1961, at pp. 326-
328.) So large a number raises serious doubt about the adequacy of faculty resources.
Id, at 7 (Approved Association Policy for § 6-1(4)).
36. Hackin v. Lockwood, 361 F.2d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 960
(1966) (emphasis in original).
larly so in light of the expressed differences in viewpoint between
ABA approval and AALS membership.37
Although arguments can be raised both for and against the
minimums, this particular requirement would probably be found
reasonable by the courts. A point raised in defense of the minimums
might be that the ABA's number is the actual standard, but the
AALS' is a policy statement and thus presumably less definitive and
subject to alteration. A possible argument against the minimum
number could be that since both the ABA and AALS have estab-
lished minimum student-to-faculty ratios, additional restrictions on
the law school may be unnecessarily burdensome. This latter posi-
tion could be rebutted, however, by the argument that the field of
law is too broad for any one, two, three, or five full-time faculty
members to grasp fully and to effectively keep abreast of its develop-
ments; hence, a minimum of four or six is required.
2. Deans, Librarians, and Assistant Administrative Person-
nel-Both the ABA and the AALS exclude from consideration as
full-time faculty the law school dean and law librarian.3" The obvi-
ous nonacademic demands upon their time certainly prevent the
type of devotion to classes and students that is essential for a full-
time professor. The ABA, however, goes beyond these exclusions
and does not recognize as full-time faculty assistant or associate
deans or any other person involved in the administration of the law
school. Apparently the exclusion rests with the title, regardless of the
amount of time or energies required in administration. The only ra-
tionale proffered by the ABA is that this is the "historic interpreta-
tion of Standard 402."39
The ABA has expressly determined that "[a] full-time faculty
37. The ABA acts largely because of the concern and responsibility of the judiciary
and the practicing bar for the quality of the places where new generations of lawyers
are being trained, while the AALS represents primarily the concerns of the academic
community. In addition, the AALS has a special responsibility because of the need
for educational institutions to determine whether the holder of a law degree from one
school is worthy of admission for advanced study or appointment or advancement in
the educational world.
Memorandum, Memorandum in Response to Inquines About Accreditation (AALS, undated)
(on file in office of Dickinson Law Review).
38. See note 33 supra, for the text of the ABA Standard.
Interpretation: The historic interpretation of Standard 402 by the Council of the
Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Associa-
tion and its Accreditation Committee has been that the count of full-time faculty,
under the provisions of Standard 402, does not include the dean, librarian, associate
or assistant deans or other administrators holding academic appointment. The inter-
pretation of Standard 402 by the Council and its Accreditation Committee continues
to be that of not including the dean, librarian, associate or assistant deans or other
administrators holding, academic appointment, in any computation of full-time
faculty, under the provisions of Standard 402.
ABA Interpretations, supra note 33, at 17-18.
For the AALS By-Law and Policy, see note 43 infra.
39. ABA Interpretations, supra note 33, at 17.
member is one who during the academic year devotes substantially
all his working time to teaching and legal scholarship. . . ."I The
requirement is "substantially all his working time" and not all of his
time. Clearly the express Standard envisions some outside interests
and activities of persons reasonably considered to qualify as full-
time faculty. Further imposition of these specific exclusions protects
legal academicians by requiring more of them, which unnecessarily
burdens the law school.
3. "Of Counsel"Attorneys.-The same protection of legal aca-
demicians arises in the ABA Standard 402(b) requirement of "no
outside office or business activities.' In ABA Interpretation One of
402(b), the ABA expressly prohibits "of counsel" attorneys from at-
taining full-time faculty status.42 Another Interpretation further lim-
its potential outside employment of professors: "A full-time faculty
member of an ABA approved law school who is teaching an addi-
tional full-time load at another ABA approved law school cannot be
considered as full-time faculty for either institution". 43  Full-time
teaching at one school and less than full-time teaching at another,
even if only by one credit, apparently would allow a faculty member
to be regarded as full-time at the former. Also, full-time teaching at
an approved school and full-time teaching at a nonapproved school
would result in recognition as a full-time faculty member at the for-
mer. The absence of substantial difference between either of the
above nonfull-time positions and the advisory "of counsel" designa-
tion may be pronounced enough to evoke a judicial determination of
unreasonableness in the exclusion of the latter from "full-time" con-
sideration.
Resort may be successfully made to the AALS requirements for
full-time faculty consideration. The AALS avoids express inclusions
or exclusions, but rather proposes a series of guidelines for determi-
nation of whether a teacher is full-time." A summary of these
40. ABA Standards, supra note 11, § 402(b). The full text of the section is as follows:
(b) A full-time faculty member is one who during the academic year devotes
substantially all his working time to teaching and legal scholarship, has no outside
office or business activities and whose outside professional activities, if any, are lim-
ited to those which relate to his major academic interests or enrich his capacity as
scholar and teacher, or are of service to the public generally, and do not unduly
interfere with his responsibilities as a faculty member.
Id If the latter requirement is fulfilled and outside activities of a professor "do not unduly
interfere with his responsibilites as a faculty member," what business is it of the ABA to re-
strict the course of his affairs.
41. Id.
42. ABA Interpretations, supra note 33, at 19.
43. Id, at 18.
44. (b) Size. A faculty composed largely of full-time teachers is the very heart of a
successful program of legal education. Full-time teachers are those who devote substantially
their entire time to their responsibilities as teachers, scholars, and educators. This does not
guidelines suggests that the outside professional activity should: (1)
be within the major field of the teacher, (2) be novel and enriching;
(3) not interfere-with the teacher's regular presence and availability
at the law school; and (4) be characterized as public service as op-
posed to promotion of private purposes.45
No reason exists why the ABA cannot adopt a set of guidelines
similar to those proffered by the AALS for consideration of a faculty
member as full-time. Since an alternative approach is so readily
available, the ABA has no reasonable grounds to adopt the totally
restrictive and unnecessarily burdensome restraints. The express ex-
clusions should be overthrown and resort made to a more flexible
and reasonable series of guidelines.'
4. Faculty Salaries.-
The compensation paid faculty members should be sufficient
to attract and retain persons of high ability and should be reason-
ably related to the prevailing compensation of comparably quali-
fied private practitioners and government attorneys and of the
judiciary. The compensation paidfaculty members at a school seek-
ing approval should be comparable with that paidfaculty members
at similar approved law schools in the same general geographical
area.
47
ABA Standard 405(a) is precariously close to presenting a per se vio-
lation of Sherman Section 1 as a form of price fixing. Clause One of
the first sentence safely requires a salary sufficient to attract and re-
preclude professional activities outside the law school if so limited as not to divert the faculty
member from his primary interest and duty as a legal educator.
In determining whether outside professional activities are properly limited, the following
factors, among others, are of great importance:
i. The extent to which the field of outside activity coincides with the full-time
teacher's major fields or interest as a scholar and teacher,
ii. The character of the professional activity as a source of novel and enriching
experience that can be directly utilized in his capacity as an educator,
iii. The degree to which the demands of the outside activity interfere with the
teacher's regular presence in the law school and with his availability for
consultation and interchange with students and colleagues; and
iv. The extent to which the outside activity may properly be characterized as
public service, as distinct from the pursuit of private purposes.
Association Information, supra note 34, at 7 (Approved Association Policy for § 6-1(4)). AALS
accreditation is based on a law school's compliance with criteria promulgated from an aca-
demic stance; ABA accreditation requirements are developed from a professional stance. The
two sets of requirements are often conjunctive.
45. Id.
46. One court supported flexible accreditation guidelines against an attack on their
vagueness as follows:
The standards of accreditation are not guides for the layman but for professionals in
the field of education. Defmiteness mayprove in another view, to be arbitrariness. The
Association was entitled to make a conscious choice in favor of flexible standards to
accommodate variation in purpose and character among its constituent institutions,
and to avoid forcing all into a rigid and uniform mold.
Parsons College v. North Cent. Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 271 F. Supp. 65, 73
(N.D. Ill. 1967) (emphasis added). The ABA's arbitrary refusal to permit professors' outside
activities forces legal education into Judge Hoffman's "rigid and uniform mold."
47. AB4 Standards, supra note 9, § 405(a) (emphasis added).
tain qualified teachers. The Standard is also arguably safe in the
requirement that faculty salaries be "reasonably related" to private
practitioners' compensation. But the provision that faculties at "sim-
ilar approved law schools in the same general geographical area"
receive "comparable" compensation steps into the bounds of re-
straint of trade. If the law school successfully "establish[es] and
maintain[s] conditions adequate to attract and retain a competent
faculty,"48 by paying compensation "sufficient to attract and retain
persons of high ability," a further requirement that the compensa-
tion be comparable to that paid at another law school is blatantly
protective of legal academicians.
Despite the clearly unreasonable nature of this Standard, two
factors eliminate most chances for a successful action based on it.
The first factor is that the subsection is couched in terms of "should
be" not of "must be" or "shall be" and, therefore, does not seem to
be a requirement, but merely a suggestion. The second factor is sim-
ilar and even more convincing. An Interpretation of this Standard
requires that subsection (a) of the Standard "be read as one of the
things to consider when determining whether" the school has estab-
lished conditions necessary "to attract and retain a competent
faculty."49 Obviously, the ABA has provided a mere checklist of
possible conditions a law school might fulfill to assemble a proper
faculty. "Comparable" salaries are not required at all.
IV. Conclusion
The American Bar Association has firmly established its control
of the process of entrance into the legal profession. Attacks on the
fact of delegation of law school accreditation to the ABA have
proved singularly unsuccessful. Further attempts to break the grasp
that the ABA has developed must concentrate on the particular re-
quirements that it has promulgated and the methods it has employed
in enforcing them. The concentration should grow from the tradi-
tional antitrust "rule of reason" analysis and may require line-by-
line scrutiny both of requirements and published policy. Only with
this presentation made to them, will the courts be able to pierce the
apparent rationality of ABA accreditation. Only after piercing the
48. Section 405 begins with the directive that "It]he law school shall establish and main-
tain conditions adequate to attract and retain a competent faculty." Id
49. ABA Initerpretations, supra note 43, at 19. The full Interpretation reads as follows:
Interpretation 2: Subsection (a) of 405 must be read as one of the thins to con-
sider when determining whether the requirements of Section 405 "to establish and
maintain conditions adequate to attract and retain a competent faculty" are met. The
word "similar" does not exclude state supported schools, nor exclude national, as
opposed to "regional" schools.
Id.
surface may courts prevent the ABA from erecting overly prohibitive
barriers in the paths of persons aspiring to enter the legal profession.
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